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David Scheffer’s article is extremely rich and provides cause for thought concerning
the concepts of genocide and atrocity crimes. His two proposals—liberating the use
of the term ‘‘genocide’’ from manipulation by governments and international
organizations and, more generally, substituting the new concepts of ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ for the actual legal, political, and public terminology used
regarding the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—call for
some observations.
In his first proposal, Scheffer means to distinguish between the legal and the
political application of the concept of genocide in order to enable a better prevention of
the crime through faster action. If the legal application of the concept of genocide is
indeed constrained by specific and rigorous requirements,1 the political application
should be, according to Scheffer, larger and more flexible, thus permitting intervention
as soon as precursors of genocide are identified. This idea of separating the criminal
character of genocide from its political reality is appealing, and the focus on the need
for a more effective international action to intervene is definitely important.
It is, nevertheless, possible to look at this issue from a different angle, thus
reversing Scheffer’s proposal: focusing on the legal application of intervention—as
a tool for prevention, since this is the ultimate goal here—rather than on a political
application of genocide. As a matter of fact, I feel uneasy with the distinction made
between a legal and a political application of the concept of genocide. According to
Scheffer, the former is meant for the purpose of repression by prosecutors and courts,
as opposed to the latter, which is meant for the purpose of intervention by governments
and international organizations (particularly the United Nations). In my view, the
legal definition of genocide is, and should remain, applicable in all cases. Of course,
criminal repression, on the one hand, and diplomatic, economic, or (in the worst case)
military intervention, on the other, are two different type of actions that do not involve
identical stakes, nor do they have identical consequences. But both are based on legal
definitions and provided for in legal frameworks. Therefore, my suggestion is that an
effective and rapid action to intervene in an ‘‘atrocity zone’’ should be determined not
necessarily by a liberal understanding of genocide but, rather, by a sharper legal
understanding of intervention.
This approach would have three main advantages. First, it would permit the
avoidance of a simplified use of ‘‘genocide’’ that might lead to more confusion between
this concept and those of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ and ‘‘war crimes,’’ or end up
trivializing what is meant to be the ‘‘crime of crimes.’’2 Second, it would provide an
occasion to clear up the fuzziness surrounding the terms ‘‘prevention’’ and
‘‘intervention’’ from a legal point of view. Third, it would actually liberate the
international community from the need for any legal qualification attesting to or
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certifying the existence of genocide as an exclusive precondition of intervention3 and
would give even more strength—as we will see—to Scheffer’s second proposal.
In this second proposal, Scheffer sets out to render the description of genocide
and other atrocities meriting effective governmental and organizational responses
(crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and aggression)
more accurate. He therefore suggests the use of a new concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
as violations of ‘‘atrocity law’’ (a mix of international criminal law, international
human-rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law of war). There are
two main reasons to support this proposal. From a practical point of view, the
terms ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ have the great merit of addressing
a complex corpus of different criminal acts described in multiple norms of international
law, thus providing a unified and simplified (rather than accurate) description or
denomination—in other words, a useful ‘‘conceptual short cut.’’ Just as the word
‘‘feline’’ refers to many animals, the words ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’
respectively refer, in a strongly expressive (almost ‘‘visual’’) way, to diverse acts and
norms related to the most serious international crimes. From a legal point of view,
Scheffer’s second proposal is very attractive, since it reflects the spirit underlying
the work of codification4 done by both the International Law Commission (ILC) and
the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is
manifested in four key ways:
(1) Scheffer’s ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ as violations of ‘‘atrocity law’’ are actually nothing
more than the ‘‘crimes against the peace and security of mankind’’ mentioned
in the 1996 ILC Draft Code5 (crimes against UN and associated personnel
excluded)6 or the ‘‘most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole’’ of the 1998 ICC Rome Statute.7 Moreover, this corpus
of international crimes, which Scheffer refers to as ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ initially
formed part of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)8 and for Rwanda
(ICTR).9 Scheffer’s definition of each of these crimes is based on the two
tribunals’ case law. This choice is coherent and appropriate because the
aforesaid case law is itself grounded on international customary law, notably
interpreted in the light of the 1996 ILC Draft Code,10 and also greatly
influenced the drafting of the 1998 ICC Statute.11
(2) The idea that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ have in common the fact of being particularly
heinous acts of an orchestrated character, significant magnitude, and severe
gravity, committed in time of war or in time of peace, summarizes perfectly the
approach expressed in the work of the ILC, the ad hoc international judges,
and the drafters of the Rome Statute, as well as the work of major legal
scholars: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are perceived as
being ‘‘core crimes’’ of international law, constituting violations of imperative
international customary norms—or jus cogens norms12—that protect human
dignity and concerning the international community of sovereign states as a
whole.13
(3) As noted by Scheffer, the term ‘‘atrocity law’’ offers an opportunity to correct
the inaccurate general reference to ‘‘international humanitarian law’’ (i.e., the
law of armed conflicts, which does not concern genocide or crimes against
humanity committed outside the ambit of armed conflict) as the field of
international law covering the crimes in question. More precisely, it actually
acknowledges the international criminal tribunals’ broad interpretation
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of this body of law, which goes beyond both the text of their statutes14 and
the recommendations of the UN secretary-general,15 in accordance with the
ILC Draft Code and with the Rome Statute.
(4) Finally, Scheffer’s second proposal allows for the description of ‘‘what a state
appears responsible for committing’’16 and not only what individuals are
internationally held accountable for. Thus, in his estimation, ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
generate individual as well as state international responsibility. As sensitive
as the issue of state responsibility is, such a suggestion does build a bridge
connecting the ILC Draft Code and the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC statutes
(all related to individual criminal responsibility)17 with the 2001 ILC Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.18
It is particularly interesting at this point to remember that, in its first
works on state responsibility, the ILC distinguished international ‘‘delicts’’
and ‘‘crimes’’—the latter referring to violations of ‘‘superior norms’’ of
international law, which implicitly meant peremptory norms of jus cogens.19
Even though the very controversial term ‘‘international state crimes’’ has
since been abandoned, the ILC Draft Articles adopts a close distinction
between ‘‘internationally wrongful acts’’ and ‘‘serious breaches of obligations
under peremptory norms of general international law.’’20 It would, accord-
ingly, be possible to understand the latter as including breaches of obligations
under atrocity law—in other words, including atrocity crimes.21 This
possibility is confirmed by the ILC Draft Articles’ commentary on art. 40,
which defines the scope of application of those ‘‘serious breaches’’: after noting
that ‘‘it is not appropriate to set out examples of the peremptory norms
referred to in the text of article 40 itself, any more than it was in the text of
article 53 of the Vienna Convention,’’22 the drafters affirm that basic rules of
international humanitarian law and prohibitions on aggression, genocide, and
crimes against humanity are to be regarded as such.23
For all these reasons, I not only support Scheffer’s second proposal but also
believe that, looking back to the initial goal of this discussion (that is, to think
out more effective actions to intervene and protect civilian populations), his concept
of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’—as violations of atrocity law binding on individuals and
states—should be taken into consideration for a better legal understanding of
intervention.
Scheffer seems to associate the terms ‘‘intervention’’ and ‘‘prevention’’—the latter
being used in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG).24 He therefore presupposes that international intervention is
determined by the existence of acts of genocide—hence his first proposal to liberate
the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ from strict legal requirements in order to stimulate the
international community to act more quickly. In my opinion, this presupposition is
nevertheless questionable, for two reasons. First, intervention and prevention are not
necessarily interchangeable: on the one hand, international intervention may be
punitive (notably in the case of judicial intervention, such as the creation of the
international criminal tribunals by the UN Security Council); on the other, prevention
may be independent from any international intervention (in the case of national
preventive measures such as, for example, the prohibition of genocide in domestic law).
Second, the use of the term ‘‘prevention’’ in the UNCG is actually unclear,25 and
‘‘nowhere does the Genocide Convention recognize that individual States or the
international community acting in concert may or must intervene in order to prevent
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the crime.’’26 Article 1 of the UNCG definitely sets out an erga omnes obligation
to prevent (and to punish),27 but whether the scope of this obligation includes a duty of
humanitarian intervention is uncertain and controversial.28 David Scheffer himself, as
the US ambassador for war crimes at the time, expressed in late 1998 the view that
there is no such legal obligation in the strict sense of the term.29
The fact remains that art. 8 of the UNCG authorizes the contracting parties to
‘‘call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention . . . of acts of genocide.’’ The reference to the UN Charter is a key
element in better understanding intervention (putting aside the question of whether
it is a right or an obligation implicitly provided for in the UNCG), since its legal basis
is, after all, chapter 7 of that charter. As an exception to the general principles of
sovereign equality (art. 2, §1)30 and non-intervention (art. 2, §4, §7),31 the second
sentence of art. 2, §732 of the UN Charter enables the application of enforcement
measures under chapter 7 related to action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. International intervention is indeed
justified under the law of the United Nations as soon as, in the Security Council’s
discretionary estimation,33 peace and security are threatened. Now, on this particular
point, both the Security Council34 and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals35
consider that the ‘‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’’ committed
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda—that is, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, which together constitute Scheffer’s category of ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’—constitute such a threat. As a result, ‘‘[t]he implicit philosophy is that gross
human rights violations anywhere are a threat to peace and security everywhere’’36
and justify (just as breaches of peace and aggression do) an action to intervene on the
grounds of chapter 7.
More specifically, in the light of the preceding developments, it is possible to
understand intervention, legally speaking, as a collective action authorized by the
Security Council37 and determined by the occurrence of atrocity crimes (or violations of
atrocity law) that are deemed a threat to international peace and security, within the
meaning of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This apprehension of intervention, connected
with Scheffer’s concept of atrocity crimes on the basis of the normative developments
notably generated by the crises in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, can lead to a
more effective action of the international community in an ‘‘atrocity zone,’’ thus
extending the legal scope of intervention to the most serious international crimes
against fundamental human values, for the protection of civilians and in the interest of
the whole international community.
Of course, that said, and as pointed out by others, support for the international
implementation of minimum human rights in the face of severe governmental abuses
and criminality should not disguise the risk of a postcolonial revival of interventionary
diplomacy.38 The key is finding a ‘‘proper balance in particular situations as between
sovereign rights and humanitarian intervention’’39—a balance that depends, in the
last instance, on the motives behind the political will of the Security Council to use—or
not to use—its discretionary power, or on the scale of the interventionary operation
required and its evaluation, not to mention the decision-making process within the
principal organ of the United Nations often criticized for the hegemony of the United
States.40 All these elements relate to the important and ongoing debate over the forms
of legality review of Security Council decisions, ‘‘subject to respect for peremptory
norms of international law.’’41
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